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Abstract—The aim of this paper is to explore the potential of 
Game Theory (GT) in extracting rules of behaviour for emerging 
Cognitive Radio environments. We revisit the commons approach 
to unlicensed spectrum and try to show that a commons can be 
basically regulated from the inside out. GT simulations of CR 
interactions reveal the emergence of certain equilibria mirroring 
behaviours/trends?. Once these ?trends identified, norms may be 
expressed and then embedded into machines (CRs). Internalized 
norms may thus become the alternative to external enforcement 
of rules. We call these emerging norms techno-social norms 
(TSNs). TSNs could eventually become a means of regulating the 
use of unlicensed spectrum and making open spectrum access 
feasible. Open spectrum access scenarios are considered and 
analysis is performed based on reformulations of two game 
theoretical models: Cournot and Bertrand. The standard 
oligopoly models are reformulated in terms of radio resource 
access in unlicensed bands. In order to capture the large variety 
of CR interaction situations, several GT equilibrium concepts are 
considered: Nash, Pareto, Berge-Zhukovskii, and Lorenz. In 
order to capture the heterogeneity of CR interactions, the 
standard GT model is enriched allowing players to be biased 
toward different types of equilibrium (or rationality). An 
evolutionary game-equilibrium detection method is used. 
Numerical simulations bring relevant insights on the problem of 
autonomy vs. regulation in emerging CR environments. Relying 
on extensive GT simulations, some rules of behaviour – to be 
expanded into techno-social norms – may be derived. 
 
Index Terms—open spectrum access; cognitive radio 
environments; rules of behaviour, spectrum-aware 
communications, commons, non-cooperative games, equilbria, 
techno-social norms. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
urrent spectrum regimes are based on a highly prescriptive 
approach, centralized control and decisions [1], [2], [3]. 
However, regulatory bodies have acknowledged the 
inefficiencies inherent in command-and-control spectrum 
regulation. More flexible and market-driven approaches have 
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been considered [4], [5]. Coase’s vision [6] of private rights in 
spectrum has been challenged by the idea that new 
technologies make any control of spectrum unnecessary [7], 
[8], [9]. Although the administrative approach makes it easier 
for the regulators to ensure avoidance of excessive 
interference, to tailor appropriate license conditions based on 
guard bands and maximum power transmission levels [1], [2], 
[5], traditional spectrum planning has been proved to be valid 
only for a certain generation of technology. It is a slow process 
that cannot keep up with innovations and new technologies [1], 
[2], [4].  
Once of the consequences of spectrum planning 
anachronism is the large amount of underused spectrum, 
perceived as spectrum scarcity. Studies have shown that up to 
90% of the radio spectrum remains idle in any one 
geographical location [1], [5], [11], [12]. New spectrum bands 
are being released around the world (e.g. 2.6 GHz in Europe, 
the 800 MHz digital dividend, 700 MHz and AWS – 
1700/2100 MHz in the U.S., etc.). To add to the picture, 
existing spectrum bands are being deregulated to allow 
coexistence of 2G, 3G, and 4G technologies.  
Cognitive radio technology is seen as the key enabler for 
next generation communication networks, which will be 
spectrum-aware, DSA networks [11], [12], [27]. In this paper 
the autonomy vs. regulation problem in spectrum access [12] is 
addressed from a game theoretical perspective. We try to 
answer the questions: Is there a common-sense knowledge that 
can be detected and established in an emerging Cognitive 
Radio environment? Can this be embedded as rules of 
behaviour in CRs so that to reduce the need for external 
enforcement of rules? To what extent can rules of behaviour 
be expressed so that they may be internalized by intelligent 
communicating machines like CRs. 
Our focus is unlicensed spectrum. Unlicensed does not 
mean unregulated [1]. The problem with free access is that 
there is always the risk that it will eventually lead to 
interference and over-saturation, i.e., the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ or the ‘spectrum tragedy’ [13]. 
Our approach points to a built-in normative system where 
the unlicensed spectrum is managed as a regulated commons 
[3]. This leads to a discussion about the nature of a commons. 
In the context of unlicensed spectrum usage, the commons 
concept needs to be revisited. The concept of common-pool 
resources (CPRs) as defined by Ostrom [14] does not cover 
entirely the nature of the unlicensed spectrum as a resource. A 
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more nuanced and appropriate concept is needed. 
Ostrom uses the term common-pool resources to refer to 
“resource systems regardless of the property rights involved 
[15]. CPRs include natural and human constructed resources in 
which (i) exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and 
institutional means is especially costly, and (ii) exploitation by 
one user reduces resource availability for others [15]. These 
two characteristics – difficulty of exclusion and subtractability 
– create potential CPR dilemmas in which people following 
their own short-term interests produce outcomes that are not in 
anyone’s long-term interest” [15].  
When we discuss spectrum access, the dilemmas are no 
longer about the long-term interests of the users but, as the 
effects of interference are immediate, they are about the 
diminishing loss and harm produced to others. 
Our approach relies on looking at the unlicensed spectrum 
as a special type of common resource to be shared among very 
dynamic users. Social norms often serve to regulate the use of 
a common resource. In our opinion, functioning of the social 
norms, in general, is based on identity. Identity is the one that 
keeps social norms from breaking down. Both individual and 
group identity is built in time, and social norms arise by 
repeated interactions [16], [17]. But, in unlicensed spectrum 
we have anonymous users and fluid groups. There are no 
guarantees that they are likely to interact with one another on a 
regular basis [16]. Therefore identity seems to play no role 
here. 
We consider that the standard conditions [14], [17] for norm 
emergence by repeated interactions are not fulfilled in CR 
environments. A  CR built-in normative system may be more 
suitable.  
In the proposed approach, CR interactions are seen as 
strategic interactions [23], [ ]: the utility of one CR depends on 
the actions of all the other CRs in the environment. An 
intuitive metaphor describing a CR environment may be that of 
a society. The CRs’ strategic interactions may be seen as a 
kind of social interactions. Emergent norms in such systems 
may be called techno-social norms. This could be a first step 
towards a new paradigm of technical systems including 
interactions, norms, and social values. 
In this context we propose the use of extensive game 
theoretical simulations of CR interactions as a means of 
extracting norms for emerging CR environments. The 
extracted norms may than be programmed/embedded into CRs 
as operational rules. 
We see techno-social norms as a means of regulating the 
use of unlicensed spectrum and making open spectrum access 
feasible. 
Embedding techno-social norms, and eventually values – 
like fairness – into intelligent machines takes interactions to 
another level.  
Moreover, the proposed approach may be useful per se. 
CRs, conceived as intelligent agents, may directly interact 
based on strategic interactions. In this situation game equilibria 
may describe a certain kind of desirable situation from which 
no agent has any incentive to deviate. Several equilibrium 
types are considered. Some point to selfish interactions, some 
are capturing more equitable solutions. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II presents our 
proposed GT approach to CR emerging environments. Section 
III provides some basic insights to non-cooperative game 
equilibria detection. The reformulation of Cournot and 
Bertrand game theoretic models in terms of open spectrum 
access scenarios is described in Section IV. Section V presents 
and discusses the numerical results obtained from simulations. 
The conclusions are presented in Section VI 
II. GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH TO COGNITIVE 
RADIO EMERGING ENVIROMENTS 
Cognitive radio technology is seen as the key enabler for 
next generation communication networks, which will be 
spectrum-aware, DSA networks [11], [12], [27]. In a CR 
environment users strategically compete for spectrum 
resources in dynamic scenarios.  
Radio resource allocation and dynamic spectrum access 
may be described as games [18], [19], [20], [21], [22]. A game 
is any situation in which cognitive entities/agents/players 
interact. The problem in Game Theory is that players do not 
normally know in advance what strategy the other players will 
choose. That is why game equilibria, representing standard 
solution concepts, are important. Several types of non-
cooperative game equilibria are described in Section III. 
The most frequently used steady-state solution concept is 
the Nash Equilibrium (NE) [18], [23], [24], [25]. Yet, there 
are other equilibria that may be relevant for spectrum access 
scenarios and especially for extracting rules of behaviour.  
In order to illustrate the proposed approach we consider two 
oligopoly competition models – Cournot and Bertrand – 
reformulated in terms of radio resource access. Simultaneous 
access situations are considered and modelled as one-shot 
games. Continuous and discrete forms of the games are 
analyzed. We assume the wireless nodes are equipped with 
cognitive radios (i.e. have perfect channel sensing and RF 
reconfiguration capabilities) [2], [3], [12]. 
We analyze different types of game equilibria, as they 
describe various types of strategic interactions between 
cognitive agents – each CR’s action directly affects the others’ 
payoffs.   
Papers proposing game theoretical approaches to dynamic 
spectrum access [3], [18], [22], etc. discuss the Nash 
equilibrium and Pareto optimality (efficiency). NE [25] may 
be seen as an ‘as good as it gets’ situation, but it suffers from 
excessive competition among self-regarding players and the 
outcome of the game is not always Pareto efficient [26]. 
Assuming there is no reason for the players to be other then 
selfish, the following questions guide our approach:  
Q1: Can we go beyond the Nash equilibrium in one-shot 
resource access games? 
Q2: How can we get to a desired equilibrium in a highly 
dynamic CR emerging environment? 
Q3: Can we get to a solution where each player gets what 
it needs, the solution is both optimal and fair? 
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Starting with these in mind, we consider other types of 
equilibria, besides Nash and Pareto, namely: (i) the Lorenz 
equilibrium [28], [29], [30] – usually not a GT but a Multi 
Criteria Optimization solution concept – which captures a 
fairness equilibrium in a spectrum sharing situation, (ii) the 
Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium [31], [32], [33] – capturing a 
limit situation, where unreliable resources are involved, and 
(iii) the joint Nash-Pareto and Pareto-Nash equilibria [24] – 
capturing the heterogeneity of the players, considered as 
biased towards different types of rationality. 
 
III. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME EQUILIBRIA 
The following equilibria are considered: Nash, Pareto, 
Nash-Pareto, Berge-Zhukovskii, and Lorenz. 
A strategic-form game model has three major components: 
a finite set of players, a set of actions, and a payoff/utility 
function which measures the outcome for each player 
determined by the actions of all players [26]. 
Based on these three components, a game may be defined 
as a system G = (N,( Si, ui), i = 1,…, n) where: 
(i) N represents the set of n players, N = {1,…, n}. 
(ii) for each player i є N, Si represents the set of actions Si = 
{xi1, xi2, …, xim}; S = S1 x S2 x … x SN is the set of all possible 
game situations; 
(iii) for each player i є N, ui :S → R represents the payoff 
function. 
A strategy profile (strategy or action vector) is a vector 
),,...,( 1 nxxx =  where ii Sx ∈ is a strategy (or action) of 
player i. By ),( *ii xx −  we denote the strategy profile obtained 
from x* by replacing the strategy of player i with xi, i.e. 
).,...,,,,...,,(),( ** 1* 1*2*1* niiiii xxxxxxxx +−− =  
Let I be a set (coalition) of agents. (xI, x∗−I) denotes the 
strategy profile in which i ∈ I chooses the individual strategy xi 
, and each j ∈ N− I chooses x∗j. 
 
Nash equilibrium 
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in which each 
player’s strategy is a best reply to the strategies of the other 
players [10], [25]. Hence, at NE, no player can improve her 
payoff by unilateral deviation [23], [24]. 
Pareto equilibrium 
Considering two strategy profiles x and y from S, the 
strategy profile x is said to Pareto dominate the strategy profile 
y (and we write x < P y) if the payoff of each player using 
strategy x is greater or equal to the payoff associated to 
strategy y and at least one payoff is strictly greater. The set of 
all non-dominated strategies (Pareto frontier) represents the set 
of Pareto equilibria of the game [24]. 
The Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium [31] was introduced as 
a solution for games that do not have a Nash equilibrium, or 
have more than one. The Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium  (B-Z) 
touches cooperative issues and leads to the idea that 
cooperation may be brought in a non-cooperative framework. 
A strategy x∗ is a Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium, if, when at 
least one of the players of the coalition N−{i} deviates from 
her equilibrium strategy, the payoff of player i for the resulting 
strategy profile would be at most equal to her payoff ui(x∗) for 
the equilibrium strategy.  
Otherwise stated, the payoff of player i decreases if one or 
more of the other players deviate from the B-Z equilibrium 
[32].  
Formally, a strategy profile x∗ ∈ S is Berge-Zhukovskii 
equilibrium if the inequality 
ui(x∗) ≥ ui(x∗i,xN−i) 
holds for each player i = 1, ...,n, and xN−i ∈ SN−i . 
At Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium, each player maximizes 
the payoff of the other players. It reflects an altruistic tendency 
or reciprocation behaviour [33]. Indeed, according to the 
above inequality, when any player i ∈ I plays her strategy x∗
 i , 
from the Berge equilibrium x∗ , she obtains a maximum payoff 
only when  the remaining players –i play the strategy xN−i from 
the Berge equilibrium x∗. 
Lorenz equilibrium 
The most popular solution concepts in game theory, Nash 
and Pareto equilibrium, have some limitations when applied to 
real world problems. Nash equilibrium rarely ensures maximal 
payoff and the Pareto equilibrium is a set of solutions that is 
often too hard to process. However, there is an equilibrium 
concept that provides a small set of efficient solutions and is 
equitable for all players – the Lorenz equilibrium (LE).  
The Lorenz dominance relation [28], [29], [30] also called 
equitable dominance relationship, is considered. Crowding 
differential evolution may be used to detect the Lorenz-optimal 
solutions [35]. 
Lorenz dominance, as a refinement of Pareto dominance, 
deals with fair optimization problems. In addition to the initial 
objective aiming at maximizing individual utilities, fairness 
refers to the idea of favouring well-balanced utility profiles.   
 
Joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium 
In an n-player game consider that each player i acts based 
on a certain type of rationality ri, i = 1,…, n. We may consider 
a two-player game where r1 = Nash and r2 = Pareto. The first 
player is biased towards the Nash equilibrium and the other 
one is Pareto-biased. Thus, a new type of equilibrium, called 
the joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium (N-P), may be considered 
[24]. The recently introduced Nash-Pareto equilibrium concept 
[24] captures a game situation where players are biased 
towards different types of rationality: Nash and Pareto. Their 
actions are biased towards different equilibria and the resulting 
equilibrium has hybrid characteristics. 
 
Evolutionary equilibrium detection 
An evolutionary technique for equilibria detection, based on 
appropriate generative relations [24] that allow the comparison 
of strategies, is considered.  
An appealing technique is the use of generative relations 
and evolutionary algorithms for detecting equilibrium 
strategies. The payoff of each player is treated as an objective 
and the generative relation induces an appropriate dominance 
concept, which is used for fitness assignment purpose. 
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Evolutionary multiobjective algorithms are thus suitable tools 
in searching for game equilibria [24], [30], [33], [34].  
Numerical experiments aim the detection of pure equilibria 
or a combination of equilibria, paralleling cognitive radios’ 
interaction. An adaptation of the popular NSGA2 [34] has 
been considered. Similar results are obtained when using a 
multiobjective method based on the Crowding Differential 
Evolution algorithm [35] or on the Topological Species 
Conservation Algorithm [36]. 
All the considered equilibria are computationally stable 
with respect to the evolutionary detection technique. 
A population of strategies is evolved. A chromosome is an 
n-dimensional vector representing a strategy profile x ∈ S. The 
initial population is randomly generated. The population 
model is generational. The population of strategy profiles at 
iteration t may be regarded as the current equilibrium 
approximation. Subsequent application of the search operators 
is guided by a specific selection operator induced by the 
generative relation. Successive populations produce new 
approximations of the equilibrium front, which hopefully are 
better than the previous ones. 
 
IV. SPECTRUM ACCESS SCENARIOS. NUMERICAL 
EXPERIMENTS  
In order to assess open access scenarios, two oligopoly 
game models are considered and reformulated in terms of 
radio access: Cournot and Bertrand [23]. The difference 
between the two models lies in the player’s strategy – quantity 
for Cournot (number of accessed channels) and price for 
Bertrand (number of non-interfered symbols per channel). The 
cognitive radios may use different strategies: the number of 
accessed channels or the number of non-interfered symbols.   
In the Cournot economic competition players 
independently and simultaneously choose quantities of a 
product to be sold. In the Bertrand oligopoly players 
simultaneously choose prices for the products they sell [23].  
In order to illustrate open spectrum access situations, 
scenarios with two CRs simultaneously trying to access the 
same resource are considered. The resource is considered 
either a set of available channels or an available capacity.  
For the sake of clarity, CR strategies and payoffs are 
represented two-dimensionally. Many-player scenarios have 
also been analyzed. The results represent a sub-set of more 
extensive simulations.  
For equilibria detection the evolutionary technique from 
[24] is considered. A population of 100 strategies has been 
evolved using a rank based fitness assignment technique. In all 
experiments the process converges in less than 50 generations. 
Our tests show that the evolutionary method for equilibrium 
detection is scalable with respect to the number of available 
channels [37]. 
 
A. Open spectrum access – reformulation of Cournot model 
We consider an open access spectrum access scenario that 
can be modelled as a reformulation of the Cournot oligopoly 
game [18], [23], [38].  
Suppose there are n radios attempting to access the same 
whitespace simultaneously. Each radio i may decide the 
number [ )∞∈ ,0ic of simultaneous channels to access. 
Because the number of non-interfered symbols depends on the 
total number of accessed channels, each CR’s action directly 
affects the others’ payoffs.   
The question is how many simultaneous channels should 
each CR access in order to maximize its operation efficiency? 
Based on the above scenario, a reformulation of the 
Cournot game may be as follows: 
 
Players  cognitive radios attempting to access a certain set 
of channels W; 
Actions  the strategy of each player i is the number ci of 
simultaneous accessed channels;  
A strategy profile is a vector c = ( c1,…,cn). 
Payoffs  the difference between a function of goodput 
P(c)ci and the cost Kci of simultaneously accessing 
ci channels. 
We consider a linear inverse demand function in which the 
number of non-interfered symbols P(c) is determined from the 
total number ci of accessed channels (occupied bandwidth). 
The demand function can be defined as: 


 <−
=
,,0
,,)(
otherwise
WifCCW
CD  
where W > 0 is the parameter of the inverse demand function 
and C = ∑
=
n
i
ic
1
, is the aggregate number of accessed channels. 
The goodput for CR i is P(c)ci . Radio i’s cost for 
supporting ci simultaneous channels is Ci(ci) .  
The payoff of CR i may then be written [18] as: 
)()()( iiii cCccPcu −= . 
In general, P decreases with the total number of 
implemented channels and Ci increases with ci (more 
bandwidth implies more processing resources and more power 
consumption) [18]. If these effects are approximated as linear 
functions, the payoff function can be rewritten as 
ii
n
k
ki KcccWcu −





−= ∑
=1
)( , 
where   
W is the set of available channels (whitespace), and   
K is the cost of accessing one channel.  
The Nash equilibrium, considered as the solution of this 
game, can be calculated as follows: 
Ν∈∀+−= inKWci ),1/()(* . 
Reformulated Cournot – numerical experiments 
Simultaneous access scenario simulation results are 
presented for the Cournot competition. Two cognitive radios 
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simultaneously try to access a set of available channels. 
Continuous and discrete strategies are considered. 
 
Continuous instance  Cournot game 
The considered whitespace size is W = 24 (24 available 
channels). The cost of accessing one channel is K = 3. The 
action space is continuous. 
The emerging behaviour of the radio environment is 
captured by the detected equilibria (Fig. 1): Nash, Pareto, 
Nash-Pareto, Pareto-Nash, Berge-Zhukovskii, and Lorenz. The 
six types of equilibria are obtained in separate runs. 
In the continuous case, a NE to the game exists and is 
unique (7,7). The NE corresponds to the scenario where each 
of the two CRs activates 7 channels (from 24 available). 
The Pareto equilibrium (Fig. 1) describes a situation where 
the number of active channels for each CR is no more than half 
of the available set (lies in the range [0, 10.5]). Moreover, the 
sum of active channels at Pareto equilibrium is less than the 
sum of active channels at NE. The sum of simultaneously 
accessed channels is maximum at NE. Therefore, we may 
consider that this situation indicates an efficient use of the 
available spectrum, in terms of occupancy and fairness.  
Fig. 2 illustrates the payoffs of the two players, u1(c1, c2) 
and u2(c1, c2), for the Cournot resource access game. The NE 
indicates the maximum number of channels a Nash-biased CR 
may access without decreasing its payoff (Fig. 2). 
Lorenz equilibrium lies at the middle of the Pareto front 
both in the strategy space (5.25, 5.25) (Fig. 1) and in the 
payoff space (55.13, 55.13) (Fig. 2). This equilibrium is 
especially relevant for selecting a fair/equitable Nash 
equilibrium among multiple ones, as it will be the case with 
discrete strategies. The NE closest to LE is the most suitable 
candidate. We may notice that, at Lorenz equilibrium, the 
number of accessed channels for each CR is lower than at NE, 
yet the payoffs are higher. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The set of Pareto-optimal solutions is rather large, whereas 
the Lorenz equilibrium consists of a single solution - the one 
that provides the maximum possible payoff for all players. 
Similar to the Lorenz equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium also 
consists of a single solution that is also a fair one (equal 
number of channels, equal payoffs), but compared to the 
Lorenz solution it provides a lower payoff for both players 
(Fig.2).  
The joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium is achieved for the 
strategies on the N-P front (Fig. 1). We may notice that, in 
some cases, the Nash-Pareto strategy enables the CR to access 
more channels than the NE strategy (7,7). In the performed 
experiments the P-N equilibrium is symmetric to the N-P 
equilibrium. It is interesting to notice that none of the N-P or 
P-N strategies actually reach NE. 
The payoffs for the Pareto strategies (Fig. 2) are in the 
range [0, 110] and their sum is always larger than for the NE 
payoff (49,49). For each strategy of the Nash-Pareto 
equilibrium the Pareto-player has a higher payoff. The Nash-
player payoff is smaller in a Nash-Pareto situation than in a 
case where all the players are Nash-biased. 
Even if the N-P strategies allow the CRs to access more 
channels, the payoffs are smaller than for the Pareto strategies. 
This may be explained by the presence of interference 
increasing with the number of accessed channels. 
In general, NE suffers from excessive competition among 
self-regarding players and the outcome of the game is not 
always Pareto efficient [26]. In the Cournot case, the NE is 
close to the Pareto front (Fig. 2) which indicates that even if 
the users are self-regarding the outcome of a simultaneous 
access may be satisfactory.  
B-Z equilibria are represented (Fig. 1) by strategies of the 
form (a,0) or (0,b), a , b ∈  [0, 10]. This indicates that there 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Cournot strategies - Evolutionary detected equilibria: Nash (7,7), 
Pareto, Lorenz (5.25, 5.25), Berge-Zhukovskii, Nash-Pareto, and Pareto-
Nash. Continuous Cournot modelling – two cognitive radios (W = 24, K = 
3). 
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Fig. 2.  Cournot payoffs of the evolutionary detected equilibria: Nash (49, 
49), Pareto, Lorenz (55.13, 55.13), Berge-Zhukovskii, N-P, and P-N. 
Continuous Cournot modelling – two cognitive radios (W = 24, K = 3). 
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are situations where each player gets to maximize the other’s 
payoff. This also means that if one player selects a number of 
channels, the other selects none. According to B-Z semantics, 
if the idle user decides to access one or more channels, the 
active CR’s payoff decreases. This may describe a limit 
situation where resources are unreliable or very unstable, and 
may illustrate a coexistence problem. The B-Z maximum 
payoff achievable by one CR is equal to that at Pareto 
equilibrium (110.25). 
Discrete instance Cournot game  
Cournot typically allows continuous transitions between 
player actions. However, as in our modelling the actions 
concern the number of accessed channels, we may consider a 
discrete version of the game; the model becomes thus more 
realistic. For the discrete case, the equilibria cannot be 
detected by standard calculus procedures, yet the chosen 
evolutionary detection method [24], [34] proves to be efficient 
for discrete games also. 
Fig. 3 illustrates the evolutionary detected strategies for the 
discrete-form Cournot resource access game (W=24, K=3). 
Their corresponding payoffs are captured in Fig. 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We notice the existence of multiple Nash equilibria, in this 
case – three. Besides (7,7) – which is the NE of the 
continuous-form game – there are two extra Nash equilibria: 
(6,8) and (8,6) (Fig. 3). This means that each CR has three 
strategies that ensure maintaining its payoff, provided it does 
not deviate from these strategies. The extra NEa also represent 
a N-P and P-N strategy, respectively. 
However, the extra NEa are no longer perfectly equitable 
(equal number of channels, equal payoffs) as in the 
continuous-form game. This is where Lorenz equilibrium helps 
in choosing one of the Nash equilibria, namely the closest to 
LE, the most fair one. This turns out to be exactly the 
continuous-form NE (7,7) (Fig . 1). 
A rule of behaviour that may be extracted from the 
reformulation of Cournot competition is the following: if the 
CR wants to avoid the decrease of its payoff it should not 
attempt to access more channels than the number indicated by 
the NE strategy (7 channels for the current situation W=24, 
K=3) (answer to Q2). 
Also, if a CR wants to go beyond the NE it may choose the 
LE which is both equitable and profitable (answer to Q1). In 
this case each CR accesses fewer channels than at NE (5 
instead of 7) and achieves a higher payoff (55 instead of 49). 
 
B. Open spectrum access – reformulation of Bertrand model 
In the Bertrand economic competition, producers compete 
by varying the product price and thus adjusting the demand. A 
constant unit cost and linear demand function are assumed. 
Players decide their actions independently and simultaneously. 
This time, their strategy is the price instead of the quantity. 
The model was extensively used for pricing problems, 
including spectrum trading [3], [39].  
The player’s strategy in a Bertrand competition is the price. 
Considering a reformulation of the game in spectrum access 
terms, the equivalent of the price P(c) may be each CR’s target 
number of non-interfered symbols per channel. This further 
translates into capacity demand, D(p). 
The Bertrand competition for spectrum resource access may 
be reformulated as follows: 
 
Players  the cognitive radios attempting to transmit a 
number of symbols (competing for amounts of an 
available capacity W). 
Actions  the strategy of each CR i is a target number pi of 
non-interfered symbols per channel;  
Payoffs  the difference between a function of goodput 
piD(pi) and the cost Ci(D(pi))of transmitting N 
symbols. 
 
Let us consider n cognitive radios competing for a given 
available throughput W. The objective of each CR is to 
activate a subset ci of channels in order to satisfy its current 
demand level (i.e. target throughput).  We can thus write: 
∑=
i
ci NcW , 
where Nc is the total number of symbols/channel. 
The demand function of accessing a channel is a decreasing 
function D of p, where p is the number of non-interfered 
symbols.  
 
 
Fig. 3.  Discrete Cournot modelling. Strategies: Evolutionary detected 
equilibria: three Nash eq. (6,8); (7,7), (8,6), Pareto eq., Nash-Pareto, Pareto-
Nash, Berge-Zhukovskii, and Lorenz (5,5). 
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Fig. 4. Discrete Cournot modelling. Payoffs of the evolutionary detected 
equilibria: three Nash eq. (42,56); (49, 49); (56,42), Pareto eq., N-P, P-N, 
Berge-Zhukovskii, and Lorenz (55,55). 
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The payoff of player i is defined as 
.2,1)),(()()( =−= ipDCpDppu iiiiiiii  
where Ci is a cost function. 
Let us assume that the demand function is defined as 
pWpD −=)( for Wp ≤ and        
0)( =pD                 for Wp > .   
The demand D becomes zero when the requested 
throughput p reaches the available capacity W. 
The payoff function of CR i can be expressed as: 
 
jiiii pppWKpppu <−−= ),)((),( 21  
                            
.,0
),)((2/1
ji
jiii
pp
pppWKp
>=
=−−=
 
when K < W – that is the overhead cost K of accessing a 
channel is lower then the available capacity W. 
Reformulated Bertrand – numerical experiments 
Open spectrum access simulation results are presented for the 
Bertrand competition. Two cognitive radios simultaneously try 
to access amounts of an available capacity W. Continuous and 
discrete strategies are considered. 
 
Continuous instance  Bertrand game 
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 qualitatively illustrate the equilibrium 
situations for two CRs simultaneously trying to access a 
limited available capacity W.  The strategy of each CR is the 
number of non-interfered symbols per channel, pi, that they 
request. 
In a scares resource situation, the lower the CR’s target of 
non-interfered symbols per channel is, the higher the chances 
are for the CR to get access to one or several channels. On the 
other hand, as the number P(c) of non-interfered symbols per 
channel decreases, the need for channels (the demand) 
increases. Thus, a CR willing to maximize its goodput will 
attempt to occupy as many low-rate channels as possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The NE strategy (3,3) (Fig. 5) means zero payoff for each 
CR (Fig. 6). The Pareto strategies – which, for this game, are 
reduced to two (13.5,17), (17,13.5) – ensure the highest payoff 
for one CR at a time (Fig. 6). This may indicate that some sort 
of scheduling or sequential access scheme would be necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The joint strategies, Nash-Pareto and Pareto-Nash, which 
are symmetric in terms of strategies and payoffs (Fig. 5, Fig. 
6), do not ensure a least equitable distribution of payoffs: the 
Pareto player is favoured. In the continuous form of this game 
model, the Nash player’s payoff is zero. 
The experiment results suggest using Bertrand model to 
describe ‘win-lose’ situations, when considering one or more 
Pareto players. The NE describes an equal, zero-payoff, 
situation. 
 
Discrete instance Bertrand game 
Discrete-form Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly games 
exhibit multiple Nash equilibria. Multiple equilibrium points 
to choose from give more flexibility in obtaining a fair and 
efficient resource allocation.  
Discrete Bertrand modelling reveals the possibility of non-
zero payoffs for both players: Nash, Pareto, and Lorenz 
equilibria (Fig. 8).   
The evolutionary detected equilibria and payoffs are 
captured in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 (W=24, K=3). 
There are two Nash equilibria: (3,3), (4,4). This time there 
is a non-zero NE payoff : (10,10). One of the NEa, namely 
(4,4), is also a P-N strategy. 
We may also notice (Fig.8) that, in the discrete game, a 
Pareto intermediate situation (55,55) apprears in the payoff 
space. In this point boths CRs have non-zero payoffs. This 
turns out to be also the Lorenz equilibrium. Answer to Q3 
As the utility of Lorenz equilibrium is sensibly higher than 
that of Nash equilibrium, there are reasons to go beyond Nash 
equilibrium. (answer to Q1)  
N-P and P-N equilibria do not involve equal individual 
strategies and the payoffs are unbalanced (Fig. 8), reflecting a 
‘win-lose’ situation (which is typical for the standard, 
continuous Bertrand, cf. Fig. 6). 
A rule of behaviour that may be extracted is: in order to get 
non-zero payoffs, in a Bertrand competition, the fairness issue 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Bertrand strategies - Evolutionary detected equilibria: Nash (3, 3), 
Pareto, N-P, P-N, and Lorenz. Continuous-form Bertrand modelling – two 
cognitive radios (W=24, K=3). 
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Fig. 6.  Bertrand payoffs of the evolutionary detected equilibria: Nash (0, 0), 
Pareto (110.25, 0), (0, 110.25), N-P, P-N, and Lorenz (0,110.25).
Continuous Bertrand modelling – two cognitive radios (W=24, K=3). 
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cannot be ignored. Like in many social situations, fairness is 
profitable. The number of non-interfered symbols for LE is 
higher than for NE and it ensures a higher payoff. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper introduces the concept of techno-social norms 
for emerging CR environments. These norms can be derived 
from extensive GT simulations of strategic interactions 
between CRs. In order to investigate the relevance of certain 
game equilibrium concepts for the problem of open spectrum 
access, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly game models are 
reformulated in terms of spectrum resource access. Continuous 
and discrete strategies are considered. 
Several types of game equilibria are analyzed, describing 
various types of strategic interactions between CRs. Besides 
the standard Nash equilibrium we interpret the Pareto, Lorenz, 
and Berge-Zhukovkii equilibria. Joint Nash-Pareto and Pareto-
Nash equilibria are also considered. Discrete instances of 
oligopoly games exhibit multiple Nash equilibria. Discrete 
equilibria reveal new, more profitable and equitable situations. 
Fairness is profitable… The existence of multiple equilibrium 
points gives more flexibility in obtaining a fair and efficient 
resource allocation. As Lorenz equilibrium is the most 
equitable and profitable for both players it may serve for 
selecting a Nash equilibrium. In the discrete instance of the 
Bertrand competition, fairness also proves profitable – 
equitability here brings non-zero payoffs for both players.  
The Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium describes a borderline 
situation where any non-zero choice of the idle radio implies 
decreasing the payoff of the active CR. 
The considered games and equilibria enable the description 
and anticipation of a large variety of possible situations. 
Relying on such experiments, some rules of behaviour, to be 
expanded into techno-social norms may be derived. This will 
eventually lead to internalizing values like fairness into 
machines. 
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